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Assessing Moral Claims in International
Climate Change Negotiations
Yoram Margalioth*
Abstract
The paper explains the importance of narrowing the gap between developed
and developing countries’ perceptions of justice in the climate change
context and analyzes the two main ethical claims raised by the developing
countries, exposing their major weaknesses and strengths. It then offers the
adoption of harmonized carbon taxes and the rejection of Kyoto’s cap-andtrade mitigation scheme, as a way to avoid inevitably unresolved ethical
issues.
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I. Introduction

The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol expires at the end
of 2012, and all international efforts taken so far to agree on a new
international framework have failed.1 At the heart of the deadlock lies the
conflict between developed and developing countries,2 with the United
States and the large developing countries being the key (non)players.3 The
conflict surrounds the just allocation of costs.4 Developing countries want
the developed countries to bear most, if not all, of the costs of greenhouse
gas (GHG) mitigation and to help them finance adaptation to the inevitable
climate change that is already taking place and that will get much worse
even under optimistic predictions.5

1. See, e.g., ANDREW DESSLER & EDWARD A. PARSON, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: A GUIDE TO THE DEBATE xv (2d ed. 2010) (“While the Kyoto
Protocol represents a modest first step toward a concrete response to climate change, there
has been essentially no progress in negotiating the larger, longer-term changes that will be
required to slow, stop, or reverse any human-induced climate changes that are occurring.”).
2. See, e.g., id. at 188 (“[N]egotiations of mutual mitigation effort must also address
the conflict between industrialized and developing countries at the heart of the current
deadlock.”); GRACIELA CHICHILNISKY & KRISTEN A. SHEERAN, SAVING KYOTO 124 (2009)
(“[T]he conflict between the rich and the poor nations is the cause of Kyoto’s uncertain
future.”).
3. See NICHOLAS STERN, A BLUEPRINT FOR A SAFER PLANET 13 (2009) [hereinafter
STERN, BLUEPRINT] (noting that the world’s six highest emitters are China, the United States,
Indonesia, Brazil, Russia, and India, accounting together for the majority of global
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions); ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE
JUSTICE 30 (2010) (“Without deep cuts by these countries from current levels, it is
impossible to achieve reasonable stabilization goals.”) (emphasis in original). With the
exception of Russia, none of these countries has agreed to commit itself to limitations on
GHG emissions under the Kyoto Protocol—and even Russia ratified the Kyoto Protocol only
because its assigned target was to hold emissions to their 1990 level, which meant it was
provided with excessive emission permits it could sell to the other countries, as Russia’s
emissions were significantly below 1990 level at the time it joined the treaty. See also
DESSLER & PARSON, supra note 1, at 25 (“Russia, for example, met the target because of the
collapse of the Soviet economy after 1990.”).
4. See RICHARD B. STEWART & JONATHAN B. WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE
POLICY: BEYOND KYOTO 1 (2003) (discussing developing countries’ opposition to emissions
limitations and their assertion that wealthy countries “have emitted much greater amounts of
greenhouse gases in the course of industrialization and . . . currently maintain far more
greenhouse gas-intensive lifestyles”); Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2011),
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/science/topics/globalwarming/index.html (“At the heart
of the international debate is a momentous tussle between rich and poor countries over who
steps up first and who pays most for changed energy menus.”).
5. See STEWART & WIENER, supra note 4, at 42 (observing that the majority of
developing countries have “strong equity arguments” against voluntarily submitting to
growth restrictive emissions obligations).

ASSESSING MORAL CLAIMS

45

Considerations of justice are always important in negotiations.
According to Albin’s seminal study, negotiators “use principles of justice
and fairness as instruments to reach agreements and to regulate their
interaction, in light of opposing claims and interests.”6 Relying on these
principles “promotes consensus and successful outcomes.”7 Moreover,
negotiators believe that agreements that are achieved on the basis of justice
and fairness principles are more likely to be broadly supported and
enforced.8 Disagreements over issues of justice “all too often undermine the
capacity of negotiation to produce acceptable and durable solutions to
disputes.”9
In the context of climate change, accounting for justice is especially
crucial, as evidenced by the numerous international meetings that failed to
make any progress on the way to a global mitigation scheme.10 It is not
enough for a climate change treaty to make each and every developing
country better off under an objective cost-benefit analysis for developing
countries to agree to accept it.11 The treaty has to be perceived as fair.12
The classic example of such a possibility is known as the “Ultimatum
Game.”13 Two players who do not know each other have to decide how to
divide a sum of money between them.14 The first player proposes how to
divide the sum,15 and the second player can either accept or reject the

6. See CECILIA ALBIN, JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 219
(2001) (conducting case studies of the negotiations to combat acid rain, to manage
international trade, to lay the foundations for a durable Israeli-Palestinian peace in the Oslo
Accords and after, and to extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty).
7. Id.
8. See id. at 218 (discussing the motivations that drive negotiating parties to act
reasonably).
9. Id. at 1; see also LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY 18–21
(1994) (making a similar argument in the context of the North–South divide on who should
pay for climate change mitigation); CHAIM GANS, FROM RICHARD WAGNER TO THE RIGHT OF
RETURN: PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF ISRAELI PUBLIC AFFAIRS (forthcoming) (relying on
Rawls’s theory of justice in claiming that arguments that are perceived to be just and fair
may influence the regimes of the negotiating countries in ways that facilitate agreement that
would not have been reached on the basis of pure self-serving arguments).
10. See ALBIN, supra note 6, at 54–99 (providing examples of international meetings
regarding the battle against acid rain that have failed to make progress in terms of global
mitigation).
11. See id. at 98 (specifying “the financial cost of implementation and its perceived
fairness” as among the factors influencing “whether countries choose to adhere to an
environmental agreement”).
12. Id.
13. See KEN BINMORE, PLAYING FOR REAL 545 (2007) (describing in detail the
Ultimatum Game as an exception to traditional game theory).
14. See id. at 502–03 (explaining the rules of the Ultimatum Game).
15. Id.
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proposal.16 If the second player rejects it, neither player receives anything. 17
If the second player accepts, the money is split according to the proposal.18
The game is played only once so reciprocation is not an issue.19 Offers of
less than thirty percent of the sum “are refused more than half the time,
even though the responder then gets nothing at all.”20 In games played in
poor countries, offers were rejected even when “the dollar payoffs [were] a
substantial fraction of the subjects’ annual income.”21 The prominent
explanation for such a result is that people are willing to incur significant
costs to punish people who they think treated them unfairly.22
One might question whether experiments with individuals indicate
anything about government behavior in similar situations.23 The truth is that
we do not know, because we cannot run such experiments with real
governments, but these experiments form our best prediction tool.24
Being aware of the importance of justice (equity) considerations,
principles of justice and fairness were explicitly stated in the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992 (UNFCCC).25
It is the foundational legal document of global climate change negotiations,
and 195 parties have already signed and ratified it, including the United
States.26 The convention’s first principle states that “[t]he Parties should
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 546 (explaining that the motivating forces in “a repeated game can be
totally different from those of the one-shot game”).
20. Id. at 545.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 546 (“In the Ultimatum Game, we have to learn the difficult lesson that
there is no point in shooting yourself in the foot because you are angry at receiving an unfair
offer from someone you are never going to meet again.”).
23. See SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT 60 (2003) (assessing the
results of game-theory experimentation as compared to state behavior in “games of
transnational externalities”).
24. Id.; see also Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 38
WORLD POLITICS 25, 25 (1985) (“The application of game theory to international politics is
hardly new, but there has been a recent increase in the popularity of the approach.”); Ethan
Kapstein, Fairness Considerations in World Politics: Lessons from International Trade
Negotiations, 123 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 229, 234 (2008) (discussing the
Ultimatum Game in the context of international relations theory and finding that “the
adoption of fairness considerations may be crucial to the achievement of cooperative
outcomes in many settings, and that such outcomes can be achieved even in the absence of
iterated negotiations”).
25. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 3, adopted
May 9, 1992, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf [hereinafter
UNFCCC] (listing the basic principles underlying the provisions of the Convention).
26. See Status of Ratification of the Convention, United Nations Framework
Convention
on
Climate
Change,
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protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations
of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”27
Unfortunately, developed and developing countries disagree on the
principle’s interpretation, leading to the current deadlock.28 Delaying global
action is not in the interest of either party.29 Developing countries will be
the first to suffer from climate change,30 but developed countries will start
incurring huge costs due to climate change merely a decade or so later.31 In
addition, according to climate scientists, the main problem is that there are
“critical thresholds or tipping points in the climate system.”32 When the
system reaches a tipping point, such as the “collapse of the polar ice sheets
or a change in ocean circulation,”33 catastrophes will be unavoidable.34 At a
certain unknown GHG concentration, our ability to stop the transformation
of Earth into the equivalent of Venus35 will depend on risky geoengineering (e.g., injecting reflective aerosols or sulfur into the

http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php (last
visited Sept. 6, 2011) (providing detailed information on the current signatories to the
UNFCCC) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the
Environment).
27. UNFCCC, supra note 25, art. 3.1 (emphasis added). For a full discussion of the
UNFCCC’s equity principles, see infra Part I.
28. See Lavanya Rajamani, The Principle of Common but Differentiated
Responsibility and the Balance of Commitments under the Climate Regime, 9 REV. EUR.
COM. INT’L ENVT’L L. 120, 124 (2000) (“Most industrial countries opposed the inclusion of
Article 3 in the [UNFCCC] as it could potentially introduce a note of uncertainty into the
context of the [UNFCCC] obligations.”).
29. See STERN, BLUEPRINT, supra note 3, at 14 (“Delay now and haste later not only
build up damage but also risk expensive mistakes in investment decisions. The greater the
coordinated involvement of all emitters, the more successful, cheaper and equitable are the
actions and outcomes.”).
30. See POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 3, at 21–22 (“[T]he regions of the world
where the effects of emissions will be the worst also happen to be poor . . . . In addition,
poor countries tend to be more dependent on agriculture . . . . Finally, poor countries cannot
adapt as easily as rich countries, simply because of lack of resources.”).
31. Id. at 26.
32. CHICHILNISKY & SHEERAN, supra note 2, at 11.
33. Id.
34. See id. (“Once we pass these thresholds, there is no turning back and the
consequences could be dire.”).
35. See JAMES HANSEN, STORMS OF MY GRANDCHILDREN 224–26 (2009) (summarizing
changes in Venus’s atmospheric composition over time and indicating that the “Venus
Syndrome” is a major threat of rising GHG emissions). In the past, Venus was a wet planet,
but then it experienced “a ‘runaway’ greenhouse gas effect.” Id. at 225. Venus’s atmosphere
now is almost 97 percent carbon dioxide and its surface temperature is 450° Celsius (roughly
850° Fahrenheit). Id.
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stratosphere).36 The risk that such disastrous scenarios will take place is
shared by everyone on the planet,37 and as there is uncertainty regarding the
exact GHG concentration that will start the runaway GHG effect,38 all
nations will be better off if they begin climate change mitigation as soon as
possible.39
Moreover, reducing GHG concentrations gradually is much less costly
than attempting to do so over a short period of time.40 “[C]ost is linked to
the pace of change.”41 Time enables us to phase out polluting plants instead
of having to write-off relatively recent investments.42 It also takes time for
investments in climate-safe energy technologies to come to fruition.43
All of the above make it imperative to bridge the divide between the
rich and poor countries and reach international cooperation on GHG
mitigation.44 This paper analyzes the two principal justice-based arguments
raised by developing countries, exposing their major weaknesses and
strengths in an effort to narrow the gap between developed and developing
countries’ perceptions of justice in the climate change context. Once the
gap in perceptions of justice is narrowed, global abatement schemes must
be found that will avoid unresolved ethical issues, thereby increasing the
feasibility of their adoption by all parties. A Kyoto-style cap-and-trade
scheme requires allocation of emissions rights across countries45 and thus
requires raising right at the beginning of the negotiations the highly
ethically-loaded question of whether equal per-capita allocation should be

36. See id. at 224–31 (discussing the nature of risky geo-engineering models in light of
Venus’s change in atmospheric compositions over time).
37. See CHICHILNISKY & SHEERAN, supra note 2, at 11 (explaining that reaching a
tipping point in Earth’s climate system “would cause abrupt and catastrophic changes that no
living or economic system could quickly adapt to”).
38. See HANSEN, supra note 35, at 226 (noting that the question is not whether Earth
could experience a runaway greenhouse effect, but “rather, how much must carbon dioxide
(or some other climate forcing) increase before a runaway effect occurs”).
39. See CHICHILNISKY & SHEERAN, supra note 2, at 38 (“We should think of climate
policy as an insurance policy against potentially catastrophic events.”).
40. See NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW
xvi (2007) [hereinafter STERN, ECONOMICS] (“Ultimately stabilisation—at whatever level—
requires that annual emissions be brought down to more than 80% below current levels. This
is a major challenge, but sustained long-term action can achieve it at costs that are low in
comparison to the risks of inaction.”).
41. STERN, BLUEPRINT, supra note 3, at 156.
42. See id. (concluding that interim reduction targets are necessary as “[i]t would be
very costly to try to achieve most of the cuts in the last ten years of the [targeted] period”).
43. Id.
44. Supra notes 28–39 and accompanying text.
45. See POSNER AND WEISBACH, supra note 3, at 119 (detailing the various possible
emissions-allocation approaches to addressing global climate change).
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the baseline.46 Harmonized carbon taxes, with each country retaining its tax
revenue, fare much better on that front.47
Part II discusses the UNFCCC’s first principle.48 In Part III, I will
briefly explain why the developing countries’ requests to be exempted from
GHG mitigation must be rejected outright.49 Part IV discusses distributive
justice,50 and Part V discusses corrective justice.51 Finally, I conclude.52
II. United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC)
In 1992, nearly all countries of the world, including the United States,
joined an international treaty—the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC)53—to stabilize “greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”54
The treaty sets no mandatory limits on GHG emissions for individual
countries55 and contains no enforcement mechanisms.56 It merely provides
the principles on which the countries agree to base their international
agreement on climate change policy.57
The first principle reads as follows:
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present
and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and
46. See id. at 120 (“[T]he per capita approach remains the reigning political and
ethical paradigm for the distribution of permits because it has been largely unquestioned.”).
47. See Yoram Margalioth, Tax Policy Analysis of Climate Change, 64 TAX L. REV.
63, 63–87 (2010) (detailing an exposition of this argument, including application to negative
emissions (e.g., reforestation)).
48. Infra Part II.
49. Infra Part III.
50. Infra Part IV.
51. Infra Part V.
52. Infra Part VI.
53. See Status of Ratification of the Convention, supra note 26.
54. UNFCCC, supra note 25, art. 2.
55. See generally id.
56. Id.
57. See id., art. 3 (providing principles by which the Parties should be guided in
carrying out the provisions of the Convention). The treaty provides for updates (called
“protocols”) that would set mandatory emission limits. Id., art. 17. The Kyoto Protocol, to
which the United States is not a Party and which does not impose any limitations on
developing countries, came into force in 2005 and will expire at the end of 2012. See
generally Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (last visited Sept. 9, 2011) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
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respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties
should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse
effects thereof.58

The term “respective capabilities” means that rich countries should
bear most of the cost of mitigation and are expected to provide developing
countries with financial help to adapt to the climate change.59 This is a
distributive justice claim.60
The term “differentiated responsibilities” is understood by developing
countries to mean that developed countries bear greater responsibility due
to their greater contribution to global environmental degradation.61 The
literature generally refers to this claim as based on corrective justice
principles.62
Developing countries interpreted the UNFCCC as allowing their
exemption from GHG mitigation based on the “differentiated
responsibilities” justification—namely, the corrective justice claim63—and
as entitling them to financial help on the basis of the “respective
capabilities” justification.64 This interpretation of the UNFCCC as linking
between mitigation commitments and historical emissions can find support
in the differences between the commitments required of developed
58. UNFCCC, supra note 25, art. 3 (emphasis added). “The chapeau to [UNFCCC]
Article 4 (commitments) also obliges parties to take into account their common but
differentiated responsibilities in fulfilling the commitments under the [UNFCCC.].”
Rajamani, supra note 28, at 121.
59. See UNFCCC, supra note 25, art. 3 (“[T]he developed country Parties should take
the lead in combatting climate change and the adverse effects thereof.”).
60. Id.
61. See Rajamani, supra note 28, at 121 (“The principle of common but differentiated
responsibility . . . builds on the acknowledgement by industrial countries that they bear the
primary responsibility for creating climate change by taking into account the historical
(rather than future) contributions of States to climate change in determining their
responsibility under the regime.”); STERN, ECONOMICS, supra note 40, at 42 (“The argument
[that rich countries should transfer money to poor countries to help them finance adaptation]
is strongly reinforced by the historical responsibility of rich countries for the bulk of
accumulated stock of GHGs.”).
62. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J.
1565, 1565–1612 (2008) (analyzing the argument made by developing countries that the
United States owes remedial action or material compensation due to its past emissions as a
corrective justice claim).
63. See id. at 1592 (“In the context of climate change, the corrective justice argument
is that the United States wrongfully harmed the rest of the world—especially low-lying
states and others that are most vulnerable to global warming—by emitting greenhouse gases
in vast quantities.”).
64. See Rajamani, supra note 28, at 130 (providing that cooperation requires wealthier
countries to assist “countries particularly vulnerable to climate change to meet the costs of
adaptation, financing and promoting technology transfer”).
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countries and those required of economies in transition, such as Eastern
European countries.65 Economies in transition had past emissions at a scale
similar to that of developed countries, but were far poorer than developed
countries.66 Namely, their respective capabilities were similar to those of
developing countries.67
Under the UNFCCC, “economies in transition, like industrial
countries, are expected to stabilize their GHG emissions.”68 However,
“unlike industrial countries they assume no financial obligations towards
developing countries and can benefit from technological transfers.”69
“Since countries with economies in transition have not been spared
mitigation commitments, it can be inferred then that mitigation
commitments under the UNFCCC are directly linked to historical
responsibility.”70
The United States, although party to the UNFCCC, opposes the above
interpretation of the notion of differentiated responsibilities.71 When the
Kyoto Protocol was negotiated, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution (known
as the Byrd–Hagel resolution)72 that rejected any commitment to limit U.S.
GHG emissions “unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new
specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas
emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance
period.”73 The Senate expressed its concern that “developing countries
would have an unfair economic advantage if they did not face the same
restrictions as the U.S.” and that “there would be an export of U.S. jobs and
industry to developing nations.”74 The United States eventually signed the
Kyoto Protocol but never ratified it.75 Two months after taking office in
2001, the Bush administration announced it would not ratify the Kyoto
65. See id., at 126 (“Since countries with economies in transition have not been spared
mitigation commitments, it can be inferred then that mitigation commitments under the
[UNFCCC] are directly linked to historical responsibility.”).
66. See id. (citing “economic constraints” and high past-emissions rates as
characteristic of economies in transition).
67. See id. (listing the similarities shared by developing and transition economies).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See infra notes 73–74 and accompanying text (providing an example of why the
United States opposes the aforementioned interpretation of differentiated responsibilities).
72. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
73. Id.
74. Rajamani, supra note 28, at 128.
75. See Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Framework
Convention
on
Climate
Change,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (last visited Sept. 19,
2011) (providing information on current signatories to the Protocol) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
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Protocol because there was too much scientific uncertainty about climate
change76 and because ratifying it would harm the U.S. economy as no limits
were imposed on developing countries’ emissions.77
The U.S. position has not changed in all the international climate
change negotiations that took place since then.78 It is possible, however,
that the justification for the United States’ requirement that developing
countries would limit their emissions has evolved over the years.79 The
United States’ fear of economic competition may have even strengthened,
as China, India, and a few other developing countries have become leading
players in the global economy.80 But it is now also much better understood
that without universal coverage, a global mitigation scheme would be
prohibitively costly, if not completely futile,81 due to the inability to take
advantage of the least costly abatement opportunities, as well as leakage
and supply side effects, discussed in Part III below.82
III. Universal Coverage is Necessary
This paper discusses moral (equity) claims. There is no reason to think
that such claims cannot be settled without maintaining the efficiency of

76. See NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL
OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL
WARMING 169–215 (2010) (offering a historian’s account of the misuse of science for
political and commercial ends and arguing that climate skepticism is being used strategically
by the fossil fuel industry and politicians influenced by that industry).
77. See Rajamani, supra note 28, at 127 (stating the position of the United States to be
“that it would take ‘meaningful participation from key developing countries’ for the U.S. to
ratify the Protocol”).
78. See, e.g., Anup Shah, Reactions to Climate Change Negotiations and Action,
GLOBALISSUES.ORG,
http://www.globalissues.org/article/179/reactions-to-climate-changenegotiations-and-action (last visited Sept. 29, 2011) (providing background on U.S.
participation, actions, and reactions regarding climate change negotiations) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
79. See id. (describing how developing countries joined climate change negotiations in
the early 1990s not expecting to face the same emission restrictions as wealthier countries).
80. See id. (noting that President Bush found the Kyoto protocol unfair because it did
not include emission targets for China or India.
81. See HENRY D. JACOBY ET AL., SHARING THE BURDEN OF GHG REDUCTIONS (The
Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper 2008–09),
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/JacobyWeb2.pdf (presenting comparative cost data
of various reduction policy proposals); see also STEWART & WIENER, supra note 4, at 37
(arguing that without the participation of the United States, China, and other significant
developing countries such as India, Brazil and Indonesia, “the efforts of the Kyoto Protocol
participants will be swamped by the unchecked emissions increases of nonparticipants”).
82. See infra Part III (discussing the importance of universal coverage).
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climate change mitigation.83 In fact, an efficient system would create a
larger surplus that could then be divided equitably, making everyone better
off.84 Efficiency requires universal coverage for the following reasons.
Climate change is the outcome of a well-defined efficiency problem
known as a negative externality.85 This refers to instances where an
individual or a firm undertakes an action that imposes a cost on other
individuals or firms without compensating them for it.86 The absence of
compensation is the result of transaction costs that preclude negotiation of
mutually beneficial deals between the affected parties.87 In the case of GHG
emissions, these costs are borne by the entire global population.88 As a
result, there is over-burning of fossil fuels and deforestation.89
The solution to the efficiency problem is obvious. Individuals and
firms need to be forced to internalize the cost, that is, face a private cost
that is equal to the social cost.90 The social cost is the true cost of their
actions; therefore, for them to act efficiently, this is the cost they should
front.91 The most straightforward way of achieving this outcome is to
impose a tax on GHG emissions (known as Pigouvian tax, or carbon tax in
this context) equal to the marginal social cost.92 This will correct the
externality.93 Firms will abate up to the point where the marginal social cost
83. See infra Part VI (providing evidence that moral (equity) claims can be settled
while maintaining the efficiency of climate change mitigation).
84. See id. (detailing that the fact that the surplus was generated through cooperation
on climate change mitigation does not mean that it should be distributed according to
vulnerability to climate change or mitigation costs).
85. See, e.g., Hans-Werner Sinn, Public Policies Against Global Warming: A Supply
Side Approach, 15 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 360, 360–62 (2008) (describing global warming as
the greatest externality ever).
86. See Wilfred Beckerman, Global Warming and International Action: An Economic
Perspective, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 253 (Andrew Hurrell &
Benedict Kingsbury eds., 1992) (explaining the concept of an externality and how it applies
with regards to global warming).
87. See id. (emphasizing that negative externalities could be corrected if deals between
affected parties were negotiated).
88. See, e.g., JEFFREY D. SACHS, COMMON WEALTH: ECONOMICS FOR A CROWDED
PLANET 87–93 (2008) (showing the effects of the impact that GHG has made on the climate).
89. See id. at 84–85 (explaining how GHG is a result of an over-burning of fossil fuels
and deforestation).
90. See HANSEN, supra note 35, at 208 (“The solution necessarily will increase the
price of fossil fuel energy.”).
91. See id. (“Fossil fuels are cheapest because we do not take into account their true
cost to society. Effects of air and water pollution on human health care are borne by the
public.”).
92. See id. (“In the end, energy efficiency and carbon-free energy can surely be made
less expensive than fossil fuels, if fossil fuels’ cost to society is included.”).
93. See id. (showing that if the cost to society is included through a tax or some other
cost, the externality will be corrected).
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of GHG emissions is equal to the marginal cost of abatement.94 Setting a
price on GHG emissions is necessary in order to transmit their social costs
to the day-by-day decisions of all firms and individuals, thereby bringing
their activity to an efficient level.95
Another mechanism, or policy tool, to solve the externality problem is
a cap-and-trade system.96 Under cap-and-trade, the absorptive capacity of
earth’s atmosphere with respect to GHGs is calculated and is allocated to
countries in the form of emission rights (permits).97 The governments
allocate (ideally, through sale) the permits to the resident firms that are
required to use permits equivalent to their emissions.98 The permits are
tradable.99 Firms that need to increase their emission permits can buy
permits from firms that are willing to sell them.100 In effect, the buyer is
paying a charge for polluting, while the seller is being rewarded for having
reduced emissions.101 Thus, in theory, those who can reduce emissions most
cheaply will do so, achieving the pollution reduction at the lowest cost to
society, as in the case of a carbon tax.102
It is important to emphasize that for efficiency to hold, namely, to
deliver reduction of GHG emissions at the least cost to society, a common
price signal is required all over the world.103 For example, if the marginal
cost of reduction is lower in country A than in country B, then abatement
costs could be reduced by doing a little more reduction in country A and a
little less in country B.104 Relatively low investments in scrubbers, for
94.
Id.
95. See id. (explaining that the current price of fossil fuels is too low and does not
reflect the cost entailed by climate change and that “[e]nergy efficiency and carbon-free
energy can surely be made less expensive than fossil fuels, if fossil fuels’ cost to society is
included”).
96. See id. at 212–14 (presenting the cap-and-trade system as a policy tool to rectify
the externality problem).
97. See id. (defining and explaining the cap-and-trade system).
98. See id. at 208 (“A nominal cap is defined by selling a limited number of
certificates that allow a business or speculator to buy the fuel.”).
99. See id. at 212–14 (“There will be markets for these certificates on Wall Street and
such places. And markets for derivatives.”).
100. See id. (explaining how there will be a market on which to trade the permits and
that anyone who needs them will be able to procure them).
101. See id. (explaining that the cap-and-trade system is really a tax: those who do
pollute have to pay it and those that do not pollute are rewarded in that they do not have to
pay the tax and actually get paid by others eager to pay the tax).
102. See generally Mustafa H. Babiker, Climate Change Policy, Market Structure, and
Carbon Leakage, 65 J. INT’L ECON. 421 (2005) (discussing the international effects of
carbon leakage and emissions reduction strategies).
103. See id. at 443 (“These results demonstrate that implementing a policy of limiting
carbon emissions that fails to include many regions of the world may, by ignoring the role of
the global trading system, fail to achieve its stated ends.”).
104. See generally id. (evaluating emissions reduction strategies and effects).
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example, can significantly reduce emissions in developing countries,105
whereas in developed countries, such relatively inexpensive abatement
options have already been exhausted.106 This efficient result will take place
if all countries impose carbon tax at the same rate or if all countries
participate in a global cap-and-trade system.
Moreover, under partial participation, industries migrate from covered
to uncovered parts of the world (known as the “leakage” problem),107 and
reduction in the demand for fossil fuels in the covered countries, due to
restrictions on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, lowers their price in the
uncovered countries (known as the “supply-side effect”).108 This will
increase fossil fuel consumption in uncovered countries, undermining
climate change policy goals, as GHGs uniformly mix in the upper
atmosphere, making damages independent of the location of emission
sources.109
IV. Respective Capabilities (Distributive Justice)
Many argue that wealthy countries are morally required to shoulder
the bulk of the global mitigation and adaptation costs because they can
more easily afford to do so.110 This is an ability-to-pay argument.111 Henry
Shue, a distributive justice and climate change scholar, presents it in the
following especially compelling way: “Even in an emergency one pawns
the jewelry before selling the blankets . . . . Whatever justice may positively
require, it does not permit that poor nations be told to sell their blankets
[compromise their development strategies] in order that the rich nations

105. See generally id.
106. See generally id.
107. See, e.g., id. at 441 (2005) (arguing that the Kyoto Protocol resulted in an increase
in global carbon emissions).
108. See Sinn, supra note 85, at 362–63 (explaining how the demand reduction for
fossil fuels lowers their price and, thus, increases their consumption).
109. See JOSEPH E. ALDY & ROBERT N. STAVINS, INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW, in
POST-KYOTO INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY 1–25 (Aldy & Stavins eds., 2009) (“Because
GHG’s mix uniformly in the upper atmosphere, damages are completely independent of the
location of emissions sources.”).
110. See Michael Grubb, Seeking Fair Weather: Ethics and the International Debate on
Climate Change, 71 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 463, 478 (1995) (asserting that it should be the
first and overriding priority of developed countries to aid in the economic and social
development of developing countries).
111. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1583–84 (discussing distributive justice
and how it calls for the wealthy countries to prevent catastrophe simply because they are
wealthy).

56

3 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & EVN'T 43 (2012)

keep their jewelry [continue their unsustainable lifestyles].”112 Another way
to illustrate the argument is by assuming, for example, “that we could avoid
the possibility of catastrophic climate change and guarantee a decent quality
of life for everyone, all at the cost of slowing down our rate of
accumulation of purely luxury goods by two years.”113
These examples may be exaggerated, as the cost of climate change
mitigation, if incurred by rich countries alone, would require them to make
a greater sacrifice than the equivalent of a rich individual not buying luxury
goods for two years, unless “luxury” is broadly defined.114 Accepting the
claims of developing countries in the climate change context would require
developed countries to transfer hundreds of billions of dollars, and possibly
much more, to developing countries.115 Rich countries have looming budget
deficits and their own poor, hence, paying such amounts would not be a
trivial sacrifice for them.116 But it is nevertheless true that it would be a
much smaller sacrifice than that made by poor countries.
The argument, however, is inaccurate when examined from a welfarist
perspective, which is the relevant theory in the case of an ability-to-pay
argument. When measuring the ability-to-pay of individuals for distributive
justice purposes, we usually rely on income or wealth because innate
earning abilities are assumed to be private information, unobservable by the
government.117 When measuring income or wealth of countries, we usually
rely on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or GDP per capita.118

112. Grubb, supra note 110, at 478 (quoting Henry Shue, The Unavoidability of Justice,
in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 397 (Andrew Hurrell & Benedict
Kingsbury eds., 1992)).
113. Stephen M. Gardiner, Ethics and Climate Change: An Introduction, 1 WILEY
INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS: CLIMATE CHANGE 54, 55 (2010) [hereinafter Gardiner, Ethics,
An Introduction].
114. See id. (“This might satisfy the ‘care for little gains’ condition even if the cost of
those luxury goods in dollar terms were very large.”).
115. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1608 (“The key point is that such an
approach would represent a significant transfer of resources from the United States to other
nations—indeed, the transfer would be worth hundreds of billions of dollars and perhaps
more.”); see also BERT METZ, CONTROLLING CLIMATE CHANGE 343 (2010) (discussing the
investment in developing countries by the United States and how much more these
developing countries will need).
116. See id. (“[T]here is no sign that the United States wants to give hundreds of
billions of dollars to China or India. Indeed, any proposal that it should do so, in [any
context], would be unpopular to say the least; domestic political constraints would probably
doom any such proposal.”).
117. See James Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation,
38 REV. ECON. STUD. 175, 175 (1971) (presenting optimal design of the tax and transfer
system).
118. See generally SACHS, supra note 88 (using GDP per capita throughout the book to
compare the wealth of nations).
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According to public finance literature, differential commodity taxation
should not be used in the presence of an optimal income tax.119 A similar
argument was made against the use of legal rules for redistribution
purposes, namely, that legal rules, like commodity taxation, should not be
equity-informed and should only be used to correct market failures, such as
externalities (in analogy to Pigouvian taxation), serving an efficiency
cause.120 The idea is that relying on anything other than income is
redundant because it does not provide the government with any additional
information regarding the individual’s innate ability, while creating
additional, unnecessary distortions.121
There are qualifications to this argument. In case there is something
that is observable by the government and is correlated with individual’s
innate abilities, not through income, it could be used for redistribution
purposes.122 For example, if consumption patterns differed across
households with different innate earning abilities, controlling for other
differences (notably, differences in income), differential commodity
taxation could enhance welfare.123 In such a case, households with the same
level of income but different innate earning abilities would have different
consumption patterns.124 The consumption pattern, observed by the
government, would provide the government with information regarding
innate abilities and could therefore be relied on for redistribution
purposes.125
Applying this analysis to countries, it is difficult to see what relevant
information about a country’s ability-to-pay could be learned from its GHG
mitigation or adaptation costs. Surely, these costs, like any other costs,
119. See A.B. Atkinson & Joseph Stiglitz, The Design of Tax Structure: Direct Versus
Indirect Taxation, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 55, 74 (1976) (“If a general income tax function may be
chosen by the government, we have shown that, where the utility function is separable
between labor and all commodities, no indirect taxes need be employed.”). “In this case, the
use of consumption of particular commodities as a screening device offers no benefit.” Id.
120. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than
the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 677 (1994)
(“Redistribution is accomplished more efficiently through the income tax system than
through the use of legal rules, even when redistributive taxes distort behavior.”).
121. See Mirrlees, supra note 117, at 175 (“One might obtain information about a man's
income-earning potential from his apparent I.Q., the number of his degrees, his address, age
or colour: but the natural, and one would suppose the most reliable, indicator of his incomeearning potential is his income.”).
122. See id. at 207 (discussing that there are other factors than income that the
government could consider when levying taxes).
123. See Atkinson & Stiglitz, supra note 119, at 57 (“In a world where income and
wages are unobservable, but purchases of certain luxuries are observable, the latter may
provide the best screening device.”)
124.
Id.
125.
Id.
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reduce the country’s wealth. But the effect of these costs on the country’s
ability-to-pay operates through its wealth.
Climate change is only one of many factors that affect a nation’s
wealth.126 Some poor countries that will incur significant adaptation costs
will nevertheless be wealthier than other poor countries with lower climate
change-related costs.127 The latter should be helped first.
Redistribution from rich to poor should be based on the relative overall
well-being of the poor and not on one specific factor.128 Rich countries will
suffer less than poor countries from climate change, in the short term,
because they have more resources to adapt to the change (e.g., building
walls), are less dependent on agriculture, and generally tend to be located in
cooler and higher areas.129 But all countries, rich and poor, vary greatly in
the extent to which they are expected to be affected by climate change, with
some countries even benefiting from it in the short term.130
The important point, which is possibly unintuitive as it is absent from
the climate change literature, is that even if there was a perfect correlation
between mitigation and adaptation costs and countries’ poverty (as
measured, for example, according to GDP per capita), consideration of
distributive justice could not be used to justify basing transfers to
developing countries on such costs. These costs do not add any information
about the ability-to-pay of these countries that was not already captured in
their wealth.
The above analysis does not mean that redistribution from rich to poor
countries is not justified. Quite the opposite. National boundaries are
irrelevant under welfarism, which requires the application of distributive
justice to the entire world.131 But in terms of providing moral justification,
climate change is irrelevant.132
126. See SACHS, supra note 88, at 230–31 (describing that an escape from extreme
poverty requires investment in things other than climate change).
127. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1582 (noting “that some nations would
benefit far more than others from world-wide reductions”).
128. See POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 3, at 74 (“The rich indeed have an obligation
to help the poor, but they should fulfill this obligation in the best possible way . . . . It is
conceivable that climate change policies will turn out to be the best way to help poor
people.”).
129. See id. at 21–22 (describing why poor nations are likely to suffer the most from
climate change).
130. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1608 (showing how some countries, such
as Russia due to the increase in temperature and subsequent increase in agricultural
productivity, are benefitted by the climate change).
131. See LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 379
(2008) (explaining that national boundaries have practical and political significance but no
clear ethical relevance); see also PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD: THE ETHICS OF
GLOBALIZATION 154–60 (2004) (advocating the development of the ethical foundations of
the coming era of a single world community); CHARLES BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND
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In reality we see that very little global redistribution takes place.133
This may be the result of policies based on non-welfarist ethics, such as
statism,134 or could be explained within the welfarist framework by an
assumption that national policymakers assign lower weight to the welfare of
foreigners compared to that of their residents or citizens.135
Redistribution is clearly required, not only under cosmopolitanism and
welfarism, but even under statism, when it is based on humanitarian duties,
such as starvation or severe malnutrition from flooding or drought. 136
Climate change could have such effects, and rich countries should certainly
help poor countries finance the huge costs of adaptation, as preventive
action is more cost effective than emergency action, and poor countries lack
the necessary resources.137 But the reason for redistribution would then be
poverty, not its causes.
This does not mean that developed countries should only transfer cash
to alleviated their poverty and refrain from helping them through climate

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 181–82 (1979) (showing that cosmopolitanism also supports
global distributive justice by promoting principles of international distributive justice that
establish a fair division of natural resources, income, and wealth among persons living in
different countries); THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 122–23 (2008)
(arguing that the global rich have violated a negative duty which is the duty not to contribute
to the imposition of a global institutional order that foreseeably and avoidably renders the
basic socioeconomic rights of other human beings unfulfilled).
132. See KAPLOW, supra note 131, at 347 (“Considered first is the doctrine referred to
as welfarism, under which social welfare is taken to depend on individuals’ levels of wellbeing and nothing else.”).
133. See generally SACHS, supra note 88 (showing as evidence the relatively low
percentage of foreign aid in developed countries’ budgets).
134. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 116 (1999) (rejecting the idea of an
indefinite international redistribution duty and the global application of his difference
principle, mainly due to the current lack of a world government and a global legal system);
see also Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113, 125–26
(2005) (drawing a distinction between humanitarian duties, which we owe to fellow human
beings threatened with starvation or severe malnutrition, and obligations of justice, which
are limited to the nation-state).
135. See KAPLOW, supra note 131, at 379–82 (suggesting that consideration of
incentives may also limit the extent of global redistribution because differences in wellbeing across nations partially reflect differences in prior investments, such as in education,
and it would be optimal to protect winners’ claims to some degree).
136. See id. at 354–56 (describing the moral intuitions that contribute to a requirement
of redistribution based on humanitarian duties).
137. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1583 (using an example of an impending
asteriod to show the importance of preparation now: “[b]ut many scientists believe that the
best approach, considering relevant costs and benefits, is to start immediately to build
technology that will divert the asteroid”). The poorest countries will be hit earliest and
hardest by climate change, and they are particularly short of the resources requires to
manage a changing climate.
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change policies, such as limiting global GHG emissions and financing
adaptation in developing countries.138 The explanation is as follows.
An unconditioned cash transfer is generally better than a transfer of a
benefit in-kind or a cash transfer that is conditioned on the recipient’s
actions (a targeted transfer) because the former allows the recipient to
spend the money on whatever maximizes its utility.139 A transfer in-kind
may be justified in certain circumstances, such as in the case the benefit
entails positive externalities, costs the provider less than what it is worth to
the recipient, serves to overcome asymmetric information, or is a welfare
ordeal.
Redistribution from rich to poor countries through climate change
policies is a form of a transfer in-kind or a targeted cash transfer. It may be
justified on the basis of most, if not all, of the reasons mentioned above.
A. Mitigation, Adaptation, and Redistribution
When a country limits its GHG emissions, it incurs mitigation cost, but
the resulting benefits are distributed globally, as the atmosphere is a global
public good.140 For efficiency reasons, explained in Part II above,
mitigation should be performed on a global basis, so that the marginal cost
of GHG emissions would be the same all over the world.141
This could be achieved in more than one way, but for presentation
purposes I will assume it is achieved through a carbon tax. The tax rate
would be set to equal the marginal harm from climate change.142 This tax
rate would not necessarily be the optimal rate from the perspective of each
particular country for many reasons, including the following: the impact of
climate change is expected to differ across countries,143 and countries differ
138. See id. at 1591 (“We cannot exclude the possibility that desirable redistribution is
more likely to occur through climate change policy than otherwise, or to be accomplished
more effectively through climate policy than through direct foreign aid.”).
139. See id. at 1584–85 (“Other things being equal, the more sensible kind of
redistribution would be a cash transfer, so that poor nations can use the money as they see
fit.”).
140. See id. at 1610 (“Similarly, one might think that all states should receive the same
net benefit from greenhouse gas abatement.”).
141. See supra Part III (explaining why, for efficiency reasons, mitigation should be
performed on a global basis).
142. See Sinn, supra note 85, at 383 (“The theoretically correct value of the unit tax
that would internalize the marginal externalities from global warming would have to be
equal to the present value of the flow of damages it causes.”).
143. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1587 (discussing and giving examples of
the fact that not all countries will be hurt by the climate change and some countries will even
be positively affected). The climate change effects are expected to be harsher, in the near to
medium time range, on developing countries, which means that based on this factor by itself,
the optimal global tax rate would be higher (lower) than optimal for the developed
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in their opportunity costs,144 in their GHG mitigation costs,145 in their GHG
intensity,146 and in the extent to which they shift mitigation costs to
residents of other countries, for example, through increased prices of their
exported goods.147
It is therefore quite complicated to determine to what extent a global
mitigation scheme makes a specific country better or worse off. Law
professors Posner and Sunstein assume that the United States would be a
net loser under a global mitigation scheme.148 I do not find this assumption
to be plausible. Without U.S. participation, China and other developing
countries are unlikely to participate in a global GHG emissions mitigation
scheme.149 The choice faced by the United States is therefore between (a)
continued global emissions more or less at the business-as-usual (BAU)
rates, if no global agreement is reached or (b) a universal agreement that
would be set at the optimal global tax rate.150 It seems clear that the United
States would be better off under the latter option for the following two
reasons: First, because the terrible consequences suffered by hundreds of
millions of people in other parts of the world are likely to have indirect
effects on the United States, due to globalization and security issues.151
(developing) countries as a group. But this depends on how we account for time. If we take a
longer time perspective, the developed countries will incur much higher costs.
144. See Gardiner, Ethics, An Introduction, supra note 113, at 60–61 (factoring in
opportunity cost to the discussion and explaining that developing countries have greater
opportunity costs and, thus, other more important things to spend money on instead of GHG
mitigation).
145. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1611 (using the Kyoto Protocol, where
the United States would have paid eighty percent of the total, as an example to demonstrate
that the United States would pay substantially more in mitigation than other countries).
146. See ALDY & STAVINS, supra note 109, at 19–20 (“Developing countries have a key
role to play in efforts to address climate change—both because they could be strongly
affected by future damages and because they account for an increasing share of global
emissions.”). Developed countries emit fewer GHG per unit of GDP, that is, use more fossil
fuel energy to produce GDP. Id. This makes it relatively more difficult for developing
countries to meet the global standard. Id.
147. ORG. FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEV., THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE MITIGATION: POLICIES AND OPTIONS FOR GLOBAL ACTION BEYOND 2012 88–89
(2009).
148. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1567–69 (explaining that a global
mitigation scheme would not be optimal for the United States and that they would probably
be disadvantaged by it).
149. See id. at 1607–08 (discussing China and their reluctance to take blame for the
climate change situation due to their incredibly low per capita GHG emission).
150. See id. at 1574–75 (laying out and explaining the most credible options for
retribution that the United States, as well as other countries, have).
151. See id. at 1567–71 (expounding upon the choices that the United States has and
concluding that a global mitigation scheme, though not extremely beneficial for the United
States, is probably the most viable option).
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Second, an increase in temperature above moderate levels, which is the
likely outcome of a failure to reach international cooperation, will result in
grave consequences to the developed countries, including the United
States.152 Their losses, measured in monetary terms, will be much greater
than those of the developing countries.153
It is possible to make a global mitigation scheme distributionallyneutral through transfer payments.154 As the aggregate benefits exceed the
aggregate costs, it would also assure that no country would be a net-loser.155
By definition, such transfer payments do not redistribute wealth from rich
to poor countries.156 Developing countries that receive such payments,
receive them as compensation for their participation in the effort of creating
a global public good.157
In contrast, transfers from developed to developing countries to
finance adaptation can only be motivated by distributive justice. Adaptation
does not require global cooperation. It is not subject to free riding. Contrary
to mitigation—an activity that confers benefits on the entire globe—
adaptation has no external effects. When a country takes adaptation
measures it has no effect on other countries. It is a policy that benefits its
own residents alone. Therefore, when developed countries pay for
adaptation that takes place in developing countries, they do so only for
distributive justice purposes. Outside the theory of welfare-economics this
transfer may be justified on the basis of needs, according to a general
standard to which people or nations are entitled, or simply as an act of
generosity.
Developing countries prefer to see it differently.158 They would like to
view the commitment of developed countries towards them to be based on a

152. See METZ, supra note 115, at 12–20 (detailing the impact of future climate change
on developed countries). In addition, there are critical thresholds, or tipping points, in the
climate system. When the system reaches a tipping point, catastrophes on a global scale will
be unavoidable. Id.
153. See id. at 78–79 (explaining that even though rich countries, such as the United
States, can take measures to protect people, these measures will be extremely costly and,
thus, in monetary terms, they will have greater losses than developing countries).
154. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1610 (“If . . . some states receive a large
benefit (because they benefit more from a given level of abatement or can reduce their
greenhouse gases to an agreed-upon level at low cost) and other[s] . . . very little, the first
group of states should make a side payment to the second group.”).
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 1608–09 (“One answer is that the gift would represent a side-payment,
designed to ensure that developing nations—above all China—participate in the deal.”).
158. See id.at 1591–1602 (discussing the doctrine of corrective justice and the notion
that developing countries particularly blame developed countries for the current climate
change problem).
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stronger notion of entitlement—compensatory justice.159 According to this
notion, developed countries are required to indemnify costs that they
unduly inflicted upon the developing countries and may even be legally
responsible under tort law, in general, and the doctrine known as corrective
justice, in particular.160
V. Differentiated Responsibilities (Corrective Justice)
A. Possible Justifications for Using a Fairness Principle
Standard welfare-economics analysis rejects any principle whose
application depends on the use of information other than information about
well-being.161 Social policies, notably, legal rules, should be selected
entirely with respect to their effects on the well-being of individuals.162
Accordingly, notions of fairness, which are reasons that are not reducible to
concerns about individuals’ well-being, should receive no independent
weight in policy analysis.163
In light of the above, tort law should be designed and used only
according to its influence on individuals’ well-being.164 Relying on notions
such as corrective justice is either redundant when the result is the same as
under distributive justice or harmful when the outcomes differ.165
Corrective justice requires the reversal of wrongful changes to an initial

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 60–62 (1999) (discussing the
idea of well-being as one of the merits within the context of the utilitarian approach to
freedom and the foundation of justice). Non-standard welfare-economics analysis embraced
a broader perspective on the objectives of policy, such as capabilities and freedom. Cf. Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any Non-Welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the
Pareto Principle, 109 J. POLITICAL ECON. 281, 282 (2001) (suggesting the growing tension
between the concern for an individual’s well-being and factors outside of their well-being
affecting social welfare).
162. See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 16 (2002)
(“The hallmark of welfare economics is that policies are assessed exclusively in terms of
their effects on the well-being of individuals. Accordingly, whatever is relevant to
individuals’ well-being is relevant under welfare economics. . . .”).
163. See id. at 56 (discussing the effects of the Pareto Principle on determining policy
choices based on the assumption that it is not beneficial to make everyone worse off).
164. See id. at 86 (stating that “the effects of tort law are relevant to the extent that they
influence individuals’ well-being”).
165. See generally Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 TORONTO L.J.
349 (2002) [hereinafter Weinrib, Corrective Justice] (discussing the interplay between
corrective justice and distributive justice).
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distribution of resources.166 If, on the one hand, some initial distribution of
resources is just, then corrective justice seemingly does no more than
require that we return individuals to the position to which they are entitled,
merely as a matter of distributive justice.167 If, on the other hand, an initial
distribution of resources is unjust, then corrective justice seemingly requires
that we sustain or enforce an unjust distribution.168
So what could justify the use of a corrective justice notion under a
welfare-economics analysis? Practical constraints. Welfare-economics
analysis is based on the assumption that legal rules (e.g., tort law) maximize
efficiency.169 For example, in the context of tort law, legal rules are
designed to assure optimal deterrence.170 The reason legal rules can
generally ignore redistribution is the existence of a tax-and-transfer system
that operates simultaneously and redistributes resources to maximize
society’s welfare function.171 When applying this analysis to the global
context we should acknowledge that the tax-and-transfer system has no
presence. Developing countries therefore look for additional arguments and
try to apply to additional institutions (e.g., courts) in an effort to increase
the transfers to them from the developed countries.
Another reason for the use by developing countries of a corrective
justice argument is its intuitive appeal to our moral instincts.
B. Is the Intuition Justified?
According to Ernest J. Weinrib, one of the leading scholars on
corrective justice, the situation of GHG emissions does not fit a corrective
justice claim.172 For corrective justice purposes we have to establish

166. See id. at 350 (explaining that for a remedy to conform to corrective justice, it
must be aimed at both parties, in a manner in which the court takes away the wrongful gain
of one party and makes good the other party’s loss).
167. See id. at 351–52 (discussing the different functions and effects of corrective
justice versus distributive justice).
168. See id. at 352 (“The consequence of this contrast between corrective and
distributive justice is that no distributive consideration can serve as a justification for
holding one person liable to another.”).
169. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 162, at 5 (“[L]egal rules are assessed by
reference to wealth maximization or efficiency . . . .”).
170. See id. at 98 (discussing rules in tort law, whether just or unjust, that result in
greater deterrence of wrongful acts).
171. See id. at 460 (stating that distributive concerns are addressed effectively through
the income tax and transfer system).
172. Discussion with Ernest J. Weinrib, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto (May
12, 2011).
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ownership rights and fault,173 and we need to match specific victims and
injurers.174 Ownership rights and fault are two substantive requirements,
analyzed below,175 whereas the matching is merely a technical
requirement.176 Nevertheless, the matching requirement is the one that
exposes the inappropriateness of the use of corrective justice in the climate
change context.177
Corrective justice is an idea that liability rectifies the injustice inflicted
by one person on another.178 This rectification operates correlatively on
both parties.179 The central feature of a system of liability is that any
liability of a particular defendant is simultaneously a liability to a particular
plaintiff.180 In holding the defendant liable to the plaintiff, the court is
making not two separate judgments (one that awards something to the
plaintiff and the other that coincidentally takes the same from the
defendant), but a single judgment that embraces both parties in their
interrelationship.181 Each party’s position is intelligible only in the light of
the position of the other.182 The defendant cannot be thought of as liable
without reference to a plaintiff in whose favor such liability runs. 183
Similarly, the plaintiff’s entitlement exists only in and through the
defendant’s correlative obligation.184
It is difficult to imagine how countries could be matched in this way.
A high GHG-emitting country inflicts harm on the entire global population,
including its own residents. All countries are victimized to some extent by

173. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 175 (1995) [hereinafter
WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW] (discussing the idea of corrective justice as a regime of rights and
the idea of ownership as leading to a strict liability standard).
174. See id. at 71 (discussing the inherent link between a victim’s loss and the injurer’s
gain).
175. See id. at 175–76 (discussing the strict liability claims from a property
perspective).
176. See id. at 71 (describing Aristotle’s mathematical interpretation of the forms of
justice).
177. See id. at 72 (“No single mathematical operation combines proportionate and
quantitative equality[.]”).
178. See Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 165 (“[C]orrective justice has a
rectifactory function. By correcting the injustice that the defendant has inflicted on the
plaintiff, corrective justice asserts a connection between the remedy and the wrong.”).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 173 at 114–22; see also Weinrib,
Corrective Justice, supra note 165, at 349.
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the emissions of other countries. Clearly, corrective justice was designed to
handle completely different types of situations.185
C. Applying Tort Law More Generally
Even if corrective justice does not fit the climate change case, tort law
analysis could still be helpful in clarifying and assessing the strength of
moral claims that could be raised by developing countries against
developed ones.
In the context of climate change, tort law arguments require that
nations which contributed to the buildup of GHG in the atmosphere, more
than other nations, compensate those other nations for the cost they inflicted
upon them.186
I argue that to make the case that emissions were excessive we have to
adopt some benchmark, such as emissions per-capita. Otherwise it is
impossible to define in what sense nations contributed more or less to the
buildup of GHG in the atmosphere. This would be true even if we do not
assign fault. We all emit GHGs, even simply by breathing; hence we all
contribute to whatever harm takes place.187 In order for an individual to be
responsible (though not necessarily liable) to another for the harm caused
by her emissions, we need to define by what measure her emissions were
greater than his. And because the claims are brought by countries against
other countries, we need to find a way to compare the aggregate emissions
of their residents.
Simple per-capita measurement, however, cannot be considered fair.188
There are differences between countries in the amount of GHGs their
residents would need to emit to maintain an equal standard of living.189
Thus, for example, merely accounting for heating homes in cold countries
and cooling them in very warm countries would require quite significant
185. See WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 173 at 73 (“In corrective justice the unity
of the plaintiff-defendant relationship lies in the very correlativity of doing and suffering
harm.”).
186. See Stephen Gardiner, Ethics and Global Climate Change, 114 ETHICS 555, 580
(2004) [hereinafter Gardiner, Global Climate Change] (reasoning that developed countries
have overused the earth’s capacity to absorb emissions, such that “justice seems to require
that the developed countries compensate the less developed for this overuse”).
187. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1591–1601 (providing examples of what
actions lead to greenhouse gas emissions).
188. See Gardiner, Global Climate Change, supra note 186, at 584 (arguing that a
major concern with the per capita proposal is that it “does not take into account the fact that
emissions may play very different roles in people’s lives”). “In particular, some emissions
are used to produce luxury items, whereas others are necessary for most people’s survival.”
Id.
189. Id.

ASSESSING MORAL CLAIMS

67

fairness-based adjustments to the per-capita measurement.190 This, unless
we assume that residence is a matter of choice and individuals should be
held responsible for the larger amounts of GHGs they emitted due to their
choice of residence. I believe that for most people residence is not a matter
of choice. Hence, adjusting the per-capita emission measure is required, but
would be highly controversial and difficult to agree on.
Calculating the adjusted emissions per-capita measurement described
above in a way that is relevant to a tort claim would be especially difficult
because such claims are backward-looking.191 We need to find the relevant
information for past years. Fairness would require that GHG emissions be
defined to include any activity that increases the GHG concentration in the
atmosphere, as this is what creates the harm.192 It should therefore include
land use changes, such as deforestation, as they too have very significant
effects on GHG concentration.193 Because what matters is the effect of
human behavior on GHG concentration in the atmosphere, there should be
no difference between cutting down trees and driving a car.194 Both increase
GHG concentration.195 Weisbach, who looked for such data, was only able
to find data on emissions from land use change between 1950 and 2000.196
If we want to raise tort claims based on emissions that took place prior to
1950, we need to take into consideration our inability to measure the
relative per-capita emissions of quite a few countries.197
There will probably be a need to check the average global per-capita
emissions year by year and measure the deviation of each nation from the
average. For each country, this deviation would then be multiplied by its
number of residents during that year to calculate the aggregate amount of
GHG emissions it emitted above or below the benchmark. Each country
would then be required to pay (in case it emitted above the average) or be
190. Id.
191. See Gardiner, Global Climate Change, supra note 186, at 579 (arguing that the
first issue in the context of responsibility for climate change to be considered is “backwardlooking considerations”).
192. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1591–1601 (providing examples of what
actions lead to greenhouse gas emissions).
193. See David Weisbach, Negligence, Strict Liability, and Responsibility for Climate
Change 6 (The Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements Discussion Paper 1039, 2010) (discussing land use changes).
194. See id. at 7 (“Any good measure of responsibility should consider all sources of
climate change, to the extent possible.”).
195. Id.
196. See generally WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, CAIT: GREENHOUSE GAS SOURCES &
METHODS (2010), http://cait.wri.org/downloads/cait_ghgs.pdf (displaying the Climate
Analysis Indicator Tool (CAIT)) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy,
Climate, and the Environment).
197. See Weisbach, supra note 193, at 8 (discussing why data from years prior to 1950
is sparse and inadequate).
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entitled to receive a payment from the others (in case it emitted below the
average). This is a retroactive equal distribution allocation mechanism
which may be thought is what tort law is supposed to achieve, namely,
rectify the transactional imbalance.
Next we need to assess the harm. This is very complicated for at least
two reasons. First, we need to be able to put a dollar value on the cost that
each country will incur due to climate change which is the outcome of the
above average emissions of that country in the relevant years. Second, the
activity that generated the GHG emissions benefited not only those who
engaged in it, but also others.198 The United States, for example, contributed
more than its share in terms of population to the increase in GHG
concentration,199 but some of the emissions were generated by activity that
had positive spillover effects on other countries,200 including countries with
low per-capita emissions. It seems that fairness would require offsetting the
harm caused by the GHG emissions with the benefit derived via spillovers
from the activity that generated the emissions.201 I am not sure that such a
calculation is possible, and even if it were, it would probably be very
difficult to reach an international agreement on how it should be made.
Developing countries could argue that it is clear that the positive
spillovers were insignificant, pointing to the differences in GDP per
capita.202 The weakness of such an argument is that there could be many
other explanations as to why certain countries are rich while other are poor.
The earlier and greater use of fossil energy is only one of them and may not
even be that prominent.203
It might be possible to calculate the harm if we interpret the tort claim
a bit differently. We could argue that the atmosphere’s capacity to absorb
GHG without adverse effects is limited and that this is a common resource.
Developed countries took more than their fair share of this resource and by
doing so denied developing countries their fair share and should therefore
compensate them. Such a claim would require calculation of what is left of
198. See POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 3, at 106 (“Many of these benefits are
positive externalities”).
199. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1604 (listing the United States as the
world’s seventh highest per capita emitter of GHGs in 2004).
200. See id. at 1594 (“[I]f past generations of Americans have imposed costs on the rest
of the world, they have also conferred substantial benefits.”).
201. See id. at 1594 (“As long as the costs are being toted up, the beneﬁts should be as
well, and used to offset the requirements of corrective justice.”).
202. See, e.g., id. at 1606 (“China might well urge that its low per capita emissions rate
. . . should be taken into account in deciding on appropriate policy.”).
203. See, e.g., Stephen L. Parente & Edward C. Prescott, Monopoly Rights: A Barrier to
Riches, 89 AMERICAN ECON. REV. 1216, 1216 (1999) (explaining that the reason many poor
countries do not use better technologies to improve their wealth is due to protected
monopoly rights).
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the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere and a comparison of it to how
much was used by past emitters.204 These data are available.205 The
difficulty with this approach is conceptual. It requires answering the very
difficult question of how to allocate emission rights across countries. This
question is beyond the scope of this paper. I will merely note that there
seems to be no clear normative theory to guide us on it. The equal percapita basis allocation, which is highly popular with scholars and the
developing world,206 cannot be defended on normative grounds.
D. Can a Tort Claim be Directed at a Collective?
An often-repeated fairness-based objection to the use of tort claims in
the climate change context is that it is unfair to aggregate every individual’s
emissions in each country.207 The tort claim is directed at the country and
thereby to all individuals who currently reside in it, but those individuals
may differ sharply in their GHG emissions. Some individuals may have
consumed only relatively little electricity and did not own a vehicle, while
others emitted a lot.
I do not find this argument convincing. Under the tort claim, if
successful, the state will be required to pay compensation. This will be paid
from revenue raised by its tax system. It is the government’s responsibility
toward its residents to raise the taxes according to each individual’s
emissions. In the likely case that the government did not do so, it is the
government’s fault that it did not impose taxes on GHG emissions. The
citizens can raise claims against their own government for not making
people pay for the real cost of their activities, but they cannot raise any
claims against other countries that request compensation based on the harm
that was caused to them. As for the responsibility of people for the
wrongful acts of their governments, there are scholars who argue that in a

204. See Wallace S. Broecker, CO2 Arithmetic, 315 SCI. 1371 (2007) (calculating
necessary GHG emission limits based on the concept of a “carbon pie”).
205. Id.
206. See Eric Neumayer, In Defense of Historical Accountability for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, 33 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 185, 187 (2000) (“That emission rights should be
allocated on an equal per capita basis and that historical differences in emissions should also
be accounted for is . . . the shared view of almost every scholar and policy maker from the
developing world.”).
207. See id. at 188 (suggesting that one objection to accountability “holds that present
generation of developed countries must not be held accountable for something that was
caused not by themselves, but by individuals in the past”).
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democracy individuals may be held liable, unless they did whatever they
could (e.g., voting and demonstrating) against it.208
Another related aspect has to do with time.209 Some of the current
residents were not residents of that country at the time the GHG emissions
took place.210 They may have been residents of a different country. Some
people were born only later. How can these people be responsible for
emissions that took place before they were born or immigrated to the
country?
A possible justification is that people who immigrate to a country, or
are born there, benefit from its wealth. Past GHG emissions contributed to
the economic growth of the country, and they benefit from it. A state is an
institution that outlives its residents. New residents, by immigration or
birth, inherit both rights and responsibilities. An argument by
environmental philosopher Stephen Gardiner is stated as follows: “Put most
baldly, if we are not responsible for at least some of the debts incurred by
our ancestors, why are we entitled to inherit all of the benefits of their
activities? Hence, if we disavow their emissions, must we also relinquish
the territory and infrastructure they left to us?”211 Shue provides the
example of an individual who inherited a suit from his father and it turned
out that his father had not paid the tailor.212 Shue argues that he would be
bound to pay the tailor213 and that this would be the case even if the father
did not pay the tailor because he mistakenly thought the suit was gift.214
E. Liability (Fault)
Assuming we can solve the measurement problems, there is a need to
distinguish between responsibility and liability. As will be discussed below,
it is much easier to base a tort law-inspired moral claim on responsibility
208. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 300–01 (1977) (stating that a
citizen’s lack of participating, in voting in particular, renders them responsible for the
subsequent wrongful actions that result from their non-participation).
209. See Neumayer, supra note 206, at 188 (“A second objection holds that the present
generation of developed countries must not be held accountable for something that was
caused not by themselves, but by individuals in the past who are long since dead.”).
210. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1593 (“The basic problem for corrective
justice is that dead wrongdoers cannot be punished or held responsible for their behavior, or
forced to compensate those they have harmed.”).
211. Gardiner, Ethics, An Introduction, supra note 113, at 57.
212. Henry Shue, Historical Responsibility (Technical Brieﬁng for Ad Hoc Working
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention [AWG-LCA], SBSTA,
UNFCC,
Bonn,
4
June
2009),
available
at
http://unfccc.int/ﬁles/meetings/adhocworkinggroups/lca/application/pdf/1shuerev.pdf.
213. Id.
214. Id.

ASSESSING MORAL CLAIMS

71

than to prove fault.215 In tort law, we usually require fault.216 Therefore, if
we look to the law as our normative guide, we should generally raise claims
only with regard to faulty behavior.
Once we require fault, there is a very strong fairness-based case to
limit tort claims to emissions that took place only in recent years.217 The
reason is simple. Until relatively recently, developed countries were not
(and could not be) aware of the effects of GHG emissions and so should not
be held accountable for past emissions. Nor could they have known that
fossil fuels would remain essential to the economy for centuries to come:
their emissions only became part of a problem because economies
continued to depend on fossil fuels.218 What is the cut-off date? Before what
point should emitters not be blamed for emissions? There are various
possible dates. In my opinion, the earliest possible date is 1992, when
nearly all countries of the world signed the UNFCCC,219 which stated that
“[t]he Parties to this Convention [are] [c]oncerned that human activities
have been substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gases, that these increases enhance the natural greenhouse
effect, and that this will result on average in an additional warming of the
Earth’s surface and atmosphere and may adversely affect natural
ecosystems and humankind.”220
F. What would be Regarded as Negligent Behavior?
Posner and Sunstein argue that on the individual level, each GHGemitting activity cannot be regarded as negligent if the benefit the
individual derived from the activity was greater than what she would have
been required to pay under a carbon tax regime, had such a system been in
place.221 Assuming that a carbon tax would have added ten cents to the
price of a gallon of gas,222 Posner and Sunstein argue that “a person is
negligent when she drives rather than walks if the benefit she obtains from
215. See infra Part IV.G.
216. See Weisbach, supra note 193, at 28 (“Most notions of responsibility require fault.
This is deeply embedded in tort law.”).
217. See id. at 28–30 (discussing why fault-based claims are improbable in the context
of greenhouse gas emissions).
218. See Mathias Risse, Who Should Shoulder the Burden? Global Climate Change and
Common Ownership of the Earth (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Faculty Research, Working Paper
No. RWP08-075, 2008) (mentioning the “considerable” amount of carbon dioxide that has
been a result of burning fossil fuels).
219. UNFCCC, supra note 25, at 1.
220. Id.
221. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1600.
222. See WILLIAM NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE 196 (2008) (relying on an
estimate by Nordhaus of what would be the optimal carbon tax in 2010).
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driving is less than ten cents per gallon consumed. The argument could be
extended to the choice of driving rather than using convenient forms of
public transportation and to other activities as well.”223
This, however, is merely another version of the argument against
aggregation which I find to be problematic. This time, the argument is also
against aggregation of an individual’s many separate acts. The carbon tax is
a Pigouvian tax.224 Its main purpose is not to raise revenue, but to change
individuals’ behavior.225 The example gives the impression that the tax will
be too small to change anyone’s behavior.226 But this would mean that
either everyone in the United States is behaving efficiently, fully
internalizing the costs (in terms of climate change) of their behavior, or that
the tax is too low, namely, that it is not set at the optimal rate.227 Plausibly
assuming that a tax set at the optimal rate would change many individuals’
behavior, this aggregate change in behavior represents the negligence,
measured collectively.228 It can then be arbitrarily attributed to the
individuals who form the group.
Posner and Sunstein also argue as follows:
If many or most people fail to pay a carbon tax or (as we argue) fail to
act as if they pay it by cutting back on less important activities that
produce greenhouse gases, then the contribution of Americans who do
this is quite small. And if this is the case, it cannot be considered
negligent for Americans to fail to reduce their greenhouse gas emitting
activities. Put differently, it is not negligent to fail to contribute to a
public good if not enough others are doing similarly, so that the public
good would not be created even if one did contribute.229

I do not find this argument convincing. First, the underlying
assumption that climate change is an all-or-nothing phenomenon is wrong.
If “the public good was not created,”230 namely, if dangerous climate
change is taking place, any additional emission increases the harm. This is
not equivalent to the case (analyzed by philosophers, as will be described
below)231 where many people kill a person together, each contributing a
little to the killing, and some of them, unknowingly, do so after the person
223. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1599.
224. See Weisbach, supra note 193, at, 37 (explaining the theory behind Pigouvian tax).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1600 (citing Matthew D. Alder, Corrective
Justice and Liability for Global Warming, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1859, 1862–63 (2007)).
230. Id.
231. See infra Part IV.G–H.

ASSESSING MORAL CLAIMS

73

is already dead.232 The earth is not dead yet, so adding excessive emissions
is morally wrong.
Even assuming that the emissions were so severe that nothing could be
done to save the planet, their behavior would have been negligent according
to the following classic statement by Parfit: “Even if an act harms no one,
this act may be wrong because it is one of a set of acts that together harm
other people.”233 In the case of a jointly harmful act, the order in which the
agents contribute to that harm is irrelevant in the moral assessment of the
agents’ behavior.234 The American individuals who emit beyond their
baseline per-capita emissions contribute to the harm, together with all other
individuals in the world who exceed their per-capita level. Each one of
them is morally liable.
G. Responsibility
As argued above, the law generally requires liability, namely, fault.235
Even when strict liability is the legal rule, often the underlying rationale is
that the activity was faulty, even if, to save costs, proving this is not
required.236 Moral considerations, however, can be broader than the legal
system. I do not think that developing countries should base their claims on
arguments that cannot be supported by the law, but it is not my opinion that
matters. What matters, as explained in the Introduction, is what developing
countries think, and feel, to be a fair allocation of the cost of climate
change.237
We discussed a notion of fairness.238 As such, it is based on our sense
of what is right and wrong. In the tort context, it invokes the intuitive
principle that one should “clean up one’s own mess,” or the “you broke it,

232. See generally DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 70 (1984) (philosophizing
over the individualization of multi-person activities).
233. Id.; see also STEVE VANDERHEIDEN, ATMOSPHERIC JUSTICE 165 (2008) (quoting
DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 70 (1984)).
234. See VANDERHEIDEN, supra note 233, at 165 (“Where joint contributions to a
collective harm involve thresholds, the relevant fact is not the order in which each
contributed . . . but rather the fact that theirs was one of a set of acts that caused some good
or bad outcome.”).
235. See supra Part IV.E.
236. Id.
237. See supra Part I.
238. See supra Part IV.A.
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you fix it” rationale.239 This suggests that the developed (i.e., industrialized)
countries should bear the costs imposed by their past emissions.240
When responsibility, not liability, is the guiding norm, the argument
against the application of tort to emissions before 1992 loses much of its
force.241 It is clear that past emitters cannot be blamed, but it is not clear
that they do not have a moral responsibility to correct whatever wrong they
did, even if it was unintentional.
As illustrated by Gardiner,
If I accidentally break something of yours, we usually think that I have
some obligation to fix it, even if I was ignorant that my behavior was
dangerous, and perhaps even if I could not have known. It remains true
that I broke it, and in many contexts that is sufficient. After all, if I am
not to fix it, who will? Even if it is not completely fair that I bear the
burden, isn’t it at least less unfair than leaving you to bear it alone?242

This seems especially unfair in the climate change context where the
countries that “broke it” are generally much wealthier than the other
countries that now have to incur great costs to deal with the possible
consequences of the “broken” atmosphere.243 This last comment leads to a
different type of objection to the use of tort claims, an objection that does
not depend on whether liability or responsibility is the underlying norm, as
will be discussed below.244
H. The Distributive Implications of Accepting the Corrective Justice Claim
The frequent use of the corrective justice claim in the climate change
negotiations is based on a factual assumption that developed countries are
responsible for a very large percentage of the historical emissions, whereas
the costs likely to be imposed by those emissions are expected to be
disproportionately visited on the poorer countries.245 This is also reflected
in the UNFCCC as follows: “Noting that the largest share of historical and
239. See Gardiner, Ethics, An Introduction, supra note 113, at 56 (quoting Henry Shue,
Global Environment and International Inequality, 75 INT. AFFAIRS 531(1999)).
240. See Gardiner, Global Climate Change, supra note 186, at 579 (reasoning that since
developed countries have contributed largely to the stock of GHG in the atmosphere, they
should bear the costs of climate change imposed by those emissions).
241. Id.
242. Gardiner, Ethics, An Introduction, supra note 113, at 56 (citing Henry Shue,
Global Environment and International Inequality, 75 INT. AFFAIRS 531(1999)).
243. Id.
244. See infra Part IV.H.
245. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE CHANGE
1995: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 94 (1996).
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current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed
countries.”246
Weisbach presents an alternative view.247 He found that many poor
countries are among the top current emitters of GHGs, especially if we take
changes in land use into account, as we should.248 Using the data he could
find on emissions, including land use change and the World Bank definition
of high income of more than $11,906 GDP per capita, he found that high
income countries in the top 20 emitters comprise thirty-six percent of
cumulative emissions.249 Other countries make up forty-one percent of
cumulative emissions, and the results hold if we look at the entire list of
countries.250
Weisbach found that once we account for land use change, there are
many developing countries on the list of top emitters, with Brazil and
Venezuela among the major emitters in terms of the percentage of their
contributions to the global total.251
It is clear that the United States and a few other developed countries
are responsible for a large share of the GHG stock and are high per-capita
emitters.252 It is also clear that many poor countries that will be severely
harmed by climate change are far less responsible for the existing GHG
stock, both in absolute terms, and due to their much lower emissions percapita.253 India is a case in point.254
However, what has also become clear is that the conventional wisdom
was based on the aggregation of many developing countries together, while
ignoring emissions from land use change.255 Weisbach highlighted the
surprising fact that it was not only rich countries that contributed to the
stock of GHG in the atmosphere; many poor countries have very high
emissions per-capita.256 This means that if we endorse the use of tort claims
in the climate change context, and assuming that the required calculations
could be made, many poor countries will be held liable/responsible.257 Tort
246. UNFCCC, supra note 25, at 1.
247. See Weisbach, Negligence, supra note 193, at 32 (The Harvard Project on
International Climate Agreements Discussion Paper, 2010) [hereinafter Weisbach] (arguing
that many poor countries are top emitters, even on a per-capita basis).
248. See id. at 14–15 (“[P]oor countries have higher emissions from land use
change . . . .”).
249. Id. at 16.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 18–19.
252. Id. at 16.
253. Weisbach, supra note 193, at 16.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 17–18.
257. Id. at 35.
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claims would therefore have unwarranted distributive implications.258
Under a welfarist analysis, this would be a strong claim against the use of
corrective justice,259 but this is not very meaningful because, under a
welfare analysis, we would not have considered corrective justice, which is
a fairness-based notion, in the first place. However, the distributive effects
also matter under an equality-based analysis.260 Remembering that the
principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”261 in the UNFCCC
was followed by the words “and respective capabilities”262 tells us that
promoting corrective justice (the differentiated responsibilities) was not
supposed to be in conflict with the redistributive goal (“respective
capabilities”).263
VI. Conclusion
International climate change negotiations are complex, and a lot is at
stake. Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations, expressed it
succinctly in his 2007 speech in Bali: “Today we are at a crossroads—one
path leading towards a comprehensive new climate agreement and the other
towards a betrayal of our planet and our children. The choice is clear.”264
We are still at that crossroads and the choice is still clear. But the
temptation to free ride is great, as mitigation costs are high, and near
universal cooperation is required.265 There are no historical precedents for
international cooperation in which so many countries cooperated over such
high economic stakes.266
Developed countries are expected to show leadership, but the major
developing countries will have to join them at the helm. As stated by
climate change expert Nicholas Stern, “the future of the climate will largely
258. See id. at 35 (“Notions of corrective justice typically make no exception for
income levels or poverty. Tort law imposes liability on negligent injurers regardless of
income: if you negligently hit me with your car, you are liable even if you are poor.”).
259. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1610–11 (noting the welfarist analysis in
connection with corrective justice).
260. Id.
261. UNFCCC, supra note 25, at 1.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary General, Address at the United Nations
Climate Change Conference (Dec. 12, 2007).
265. See METZ, supra note 115, at 318 (2010) (explaining the necessity of everyone
participating, considering that “no economic sector covers more than 25% of the total
emissions”).
266. See Thomas C. Schelling, What Makes Greenhouse Sense? Time to Rethink the
Kyoto Protocol, 81 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2, 7 (2002) (mentioning the creation of the WTO, the
Marshall Plan, and NATO as the only possible exceptions, but explaining that climate
change is much more challenging).
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be shaped by the developing countries: in population terms, it is their
planet . . . . The large developing countries will be central to the design and
execution of international action to protect their future . . . . [T]he numbers
on population and future emissions are such that a credible response cannot
come from the rich countries alone.”267
If developing countries perceive the agreement to be unfair, this would
affect not only their willingness to sign it, but also their motivation to
implement and enforce it if they signed it due to political or other
pressure.268 One of the major impediments to the success of the
international negotiations is the suspicion held by developing countries that
climate change discussions are a “tool that the North is using to slow the
economic and political rise of the South.”269 At such high levels of
suspicion, engaging in an open analysis of the moral claims by developing
countries is critical to creating the trust necessary to reach an agreement.
Finally, I find it important to stress that equity arguments should not
be used to justify exempting any nations from taking part in the global
abatement scheme. As mentioned earlier, global coverage is necessary to
prevent leakage and supply side effects.270 Without coverage on a level
sufficient to prevent leakage and supply side effects, it is doubtful that
significant, possibly disastrous, climate change can be prevented.271 Equitybased arguments should only justify transfer payments. The recipients will
be free to use the money as they see fit, but unlike the case under the Kyoto
Protocol, they will have to limit their GHG emissions (defined to include
deforestation) according to a global abatement scheme.272
I think that the global abatement scheme should be made explicit and
binding on all countries, developing and developed alike. Setting goals and
267. STERN, BLUEPRINT, supra note 3, at 13.
268. Id.
269. See Ramgopal Agarwala, Towards a Global Compact for Managing Climate
Change, in POST-KYOTO INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY 75 (Aldy & Stavins eds., 2009)
(referring to the need for the South to conduct its own research on climate change).
270. Babiker, supra note 102, at 441.
271. Sinn, supra note 85, at 360.
272. See DESSLER & PARSON, supra note 1, at 188–89 (making this suggestion,
including the possibility that developing countries’ emission limitations will become
effective conditional on “measures of development progress or indicators of the severity of
climate change risk”). If absolutely necessary to bridge the current divide between
developed and developing countries on how to share the costs of mitigation, developing
countries should be allowed to commit to emission limitations that will come into effect only
a few years after the developed countries have restricted themselves. This should be done
only as a last resort because it would be much better to include all countries immediately in
the global mitigation scheme and pay developing countries significant side-payments either
as compensation or simply as inducement. A uniform global mitigation scheme is much
more efficient and the costs saved by full coverage can be used to increase overall welfare
including increased side-payments to developing countries.
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targets for GHG emission reduction is not enough. Governments commit,
but in practice ignore the goals, either because they are overly optimistic or
because there is no sanction for failing to meet them.273 Targets are not very
helpful in solving the free riding problem.
In theory, cap-and-trade and carbon tax are equally efficient, but capand-trade requires an initial decision regarding the allocation of emission
permits to states.274 This is a highly loaded issue, as it raises very difficult
moral questions regarding people’s rights in the atmosphere. It is much
better to avoid those questions and negotiate the global abatement scheme
immediately. A carbon tax does just that and may therefore allow more
fruitful negotiations.275
“Developing countries are much more likely to agree to a global
harmonized carbon tax, with each country retaining the tax revenue, than to
any form of global cap-and-trade regime, short of one that involves an
equal per capita allocation,”276 which is unacceptable to the United States.
As I have written in another article,
The reason is simple. Under a cap-and-trade regime, when a developing
country such as China or India experiences economic growth that is
relatively greater than that experienced by developed countries, it emits
more GHG. Under a cap-and-trade regime, it is then required to
purchase permits from developed countries such as the United States.
Under a harmonized carbon tax regime, it pays more carbon taxes, but
the tax revenue is retained by its own treasury. This makes a huge
difference and is likely to be the key to achieving global cooperation. 277

Once distributive and corrective justice claims are openly discussed,
their normative weaknesses exposed, and their strengths acknowledged,
they can be put aside to allow for a forward-looking agreement to be
signed. On signing the agreement, countries will use transfer payments to
roughly equalize their benefits from the global mitigation scheme.
Developing countries will tend to be on the receiving side, due to their
comparatively high opportunity costs.278 In addition, developing countries

273. See Schelling, supra note 266, at 5 ("[N]either the United States nor the other
major developed countries will likely accept serious sanctions for missing emissions
targets.”).
274. Margalioth, supra note 47, at 64.
275. See id. at 70 (“[A] harmonized carbon tax regime . . . is likely to be the key to
achieving global cooperation.”).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 70.
278. See generally Posner & Sunstein, supra note 62 (contrasting the roles of, and
issues facing, developed and developing countries in the climate change scheme). They need
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will receive transfers on distributive (not corrective) justice grounds to
finance adaptation. To assure compliance with the mitigation scheme, these
transfers will be paid in installments, conditional on performance.

the money spent on GHG mitigation to fight poverty and to invest in technology, human
capital, and infrastructure to improve their opportunities to experience economic growth. Id.
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